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Abstract
This paper develops a game-theoretic model of petty corruptionby gov-
ernment o¢ cials. Such corruption is widespread, especially (but not only)
in developing and transition economies. The model goes beyond the previ-
ously published studies in the way it describes the structure of bureaucratic
tracks,and the information among the participants. Entrepreneurs apply,
in sequence, to a track of two or more bureaucrats in a prescribed order
for approval of their projects. Our rst result establishes that in a one-shot
situation no project ever gets approved. This result leads us to consider a
repeated interaction setting. In that context we characterize in more detail
the trigger-strategy equilibria that minimize the social loss due to the system
of bribes, and those that maximize the expected total bribe income of the
bureaucrats. The results are used to shed some light on two much advocated
anti-corruption policies: the single window policy and rotation of bureaucrats.
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Corruption is found to be one of the most damaging consequences of poor gov-
ernance characterized by lack of both transparency and accountability. Corruption
lowers investment and hinders economic growth and human development, by lim-
iting access to basic social services as well as increasing the cost of their delivery.
It also increases poverty, subverts the nancial system, and undermines the legit-
imacy of the state. Thus, corruption is anti-poor, anti-development, anti-growth,
anti-investment, and inequitable. The cost of corruption to a nation is very high.
Transparency International (Report 2003)
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Corruption, dened roughly as the abuse of public o¢ ce for private gain,1 has gen-
erated an immense literature. The well-known book by Rose-Ackerman (1999) has
some four hundred items in the list of references, and, for shorter useful surveys, one
can turn to Andvig (1991), Bardhan (1997), Lambsdor¤ (2001), and the collection of
articles edited by Elliott (1997). Perhaps the sheer volume of this literature (which
we do not attempt to survey here) is a testimony to the fact that corruption in its
many forms is not of recent origin, and not just limited to developing economies
or the economies in transition from a command to a market system. Indeed, over
the years, allegations of corruption have been important in political debates and in
ushering major political changes in many countries at di¤erent stages of develop-
ment.2 However, in many recent estimates or rankingsof corruption, developing
countries and transition economies have gured prominently, and policy makers in
those economies as well as international agencies interested in accelerating the pace
of economic development have been justiably concerned with the impact of corrup-
tion on productive e¢ ciency, growth, poverty and the proper utilization of economic
assistance.
In this paper we focus on game-theoretic modeling of petty corruption. In
some cases the term petty corruption is used in the context of relatively small
bribes. However, even in this usage it has been rightly noted that pettiness of
corruption refers only to the size of each transaction and not to its total impact on
government income or policy(Scott, 1972, p. 66). In typical examples of petty cor-
ruption, the privatecitizens (often owners of businesses or managers of rms) are
engaged in dealing with low-level government bureaucrats regarding transactions in-
volving the ling of appropriate tax returns, payment of important duties, clearance
of regulatory or licensing requirements, application for government benets (loans
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from state-owned banks, subsidies, jobs...) or approval of specic privileges (drivers
license, passport, registration of a new rm as a legitimate business activity that
complies with the laws on minimum wages, workerssafety, safe construction stan-
dards, environmental hazards,...). The basic ingredients of corruptionemphasized
by Klitgaard (1988, p. 75) include (1) government monopoly, (2) discretion in inter-
preting laws,in deciding who is eligible for benets, and in what constitutes proper
documentation and procedure, and (3) lack of direct accountability. These appear in
various ways. Some are subtle - a polite request or suggestion for a small baksheesh
(in the Indian subcontinent) to expedite decision-making, the much discussed speed
money," - and some are crude - a threat to derail the review and approval process;
to stop the le immediately(Bardhan, 1997, p. 1324)]. As one might expect from
elementary economic analysis, the exercise of the monopoly power of the bureaucrat
typically results in a redistribution of income from the applicant to the o¢ cial, but it
may also result in a loss of e¢ ciency, a so-called dead-weight loss. The latter can
occur if an economic activity (i.e., a project) that would have been protable without
the payment of a bribe becomes unprotable net of the bribe, and hence is curtailed
or even abandoned in the presence of the extortionary regime. In the theoretical
models that we develop, conditions for the persistence of petty corruption and conse-
quent social losses can be precisely identied. The game-theoretic approach typically
leads to models with multiple equilibria, and the presence of multiple equilibria in
turn raises the possibility of moving from a current badequilibrium to one that
is socially superior. The question of how to make such a move has apparently not
received much attention in game theory (see, however, Tirole, (1996)). We indicate
in some detail applications of our analytical framework to two themes of particular
interest in the literature on anti-corruption policy: (a) the single windowor one
stop shop" procedure (replacement of a track of bureaucrats by a single bureaucrat)
and (b) rotation of bureaucrats.3
One of the motivations behind our model specications is the extensive discussion
of the system of multiple approvalsor multiple vericationsthat characterize the
interaction between the citizens and the bureaucrats in the Indian subcontinent, and
on the link between such systems and pervasive petty corruption, and the resultant
e¤ects on Indias development programs.4 N. Vittal, Indias Vigilance Commis-
sioner argued, (citing UNDP calculations) that Indias GDP will go up by 1.5 per
cent if the corruption levels of India are brought down to those of Scandinavian
countries [Vittal in Gupta (2001, Chapter 2)]. And even after some fteen years
of liberalization and reforms, the project approval process has remained a source of
major irritation.5 In their widely cited article, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argued
that competing bureaucracies, each of which can stop a project from proceeding,
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hamper investment and growth around the world, but especially in countries with
weak governmentand gave Russia as a prime example (pp. 615-6). Rose-Ackerman
(1999) specically referred to corruption discouraging the ow of foreign direct in-
vestment to developing countries (p. 3).6 Thus, the models we are developing should
be of interest to a broad group of developing and transition economies.
Compared to the entire published literature on corruption, the literature on game-
theoretic analyses is rather limited. Various aspects of corruption have been studied
from this point of view, such as: bribery to avoid the payment of taxes (Marjit et
al., 2000) or the enforcement of regulations against pollution (Mookerjee and Png,
1992, 1995); bribery to avoid prosecution for crimes or to inuence anti-crime policies
(Dal Bo et al., 2003); corruption in procurement auctions (Burguet and Che, 2004;
Compte et al., 2005). Further references can be found in these publications, in
(Bardhan, 1997), and in (Mishra, 2005). We are not aware of any previous game-
theoretic analysis of bribery to obtain permits that explicitly models the structure of
bureaucratic tracks, the sequence of applicants, and the information ows among
the participants. The dynamic structure of the model also leads to a multiplicity of
equilibria. Our analysis enables us to provide information about the set of equilibria
and how this set depends on the parameters of the model.
1.2 Summary of Results
In the basic model, a sequence of entrepreneurs may apply to a trackof two or more
bureaucrats for approval of their projects. Each entrepreneur has a project that has a
specic (expected present) value that would be realized if the project were approved.
This value is known to the entrepreneur, but not to the bureaucrats. However, its
probability distribution is common knowledge. The entrepreneur must apply to each
bureaucrat in the track in a prescribed order, and her project is approved if and only
if every bureaucrat in the track approves it. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe
as a condition of approval. At any step in the period the entrepreneur may refuse
to pay the bribe, in which case she leaves the process and the value of her project is
not realized, although she loses the total amount of bribes paid up to that point. If
her project is approved by the entire track, she then receives the value of the project,
minus the total amount of bribes paid. The payo¤ to a bureaucrat in that period is
the amount of the bribe he receives, if any, and the bureaucrats total payo¤ in the
game is the expected sum of discounted bribes he receives.
It is important to distinguish between two types of interventions by a bureaucrat
when an entrepreneur plans an investment project. In order to get formal approval,
each project typically has to conform to certain requirements(e.g., by satisfying
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some safety standards or meeting appropriate norms on nancing....) A bureaucrat
may reject a qualied project if a demanded bribe is not paid. On the other hand,
a bureaucrat may approve an unqualied project in exchange for receiving a corre-
sponding bribe that he demands. Thus the bribes demanded for the approval of
qualied and unqualied projects may be di¤erent. We refer to the phenomenon of
the approval of unqualied projects as capture,as distinct from the phenomenon of
demanding a bribe for the approval of a qualied project, which we refer to as hold
upor pure extortion. For simplicity of exposition, in the formal model (Section
2) we assume that all the projects are qualied and focus on hold up.Section 3.2
provides some informal comments on "capture." A more complete formal treatment
(with detailed proofs) of both types of intervention is given in Lambert-Mogilianky,
Majumdar and Radner (2005) [to be referred to as L-M-R].
We make the following assumptions about the information that the players have
about the actions of the other players:
1. Players remember their own actions and those of the players they transact
with.
2. Within any single period, no bureaucrat knows the bribes demanded by the
other bureaucrats.
3. Every player learns the actions of the other players in previous periods,
perhaps with some delay.
With some additional technical assumptions we can show:
1. In a one-period version of the game (only one entrepreneur), there is no
equilibrium in which the project is approved with positive probability. On the other
hand, there is an equilibrium in which the entrepreneur refuses to apply to even
the rst bureaucrat in the track, no matter what the value of her project (within
the range of its probability distribution). The latter is called a null-strategy-prole
equilibrium. The result provides a natural motivation for dynamic models.
2. In the sequential version of the game, if the bureaucrats are su¢ ciently patient
(discount factor close enough to unity), then there are many equilibria, and we
describe a large family of them that we call trigger strategy prole (TSP) equilibria.
3. For any given prole of strictly positive normal bribe demands, if the bu-
reaucrats are su¢ ciently patient, then there is a TSP equilibrium that sustains those
bribes (a folk theorem). Hence, for a sequence of bureaucratsdiscount factors
approaching 1, there is a corresponding sequence of TSP equilibria that approach
social e¢ ciency.
We also examine in more detail two extremeTSP equilibria. First, a second-
best equilibrium minimizes, in the set of all equilibria of the sequential game, the
total social loss caused by the bribe system. We show that:
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4. Among the second-best equilibria there is one that is a TSP. In other words,
the second-best social loss can be attained with a TSP equilibrium.
5. If the track is replaced by a single bureaucrat, then the second-best equilibrium
bribe total will be smaller.
The other extreme equilibrium maximizes the total expected bribe income within
the family of TSP equilibria; call such a TSP equilibrium a bribe-income-maximizing
equilibrium (BIME). Call a bribe prole rst-best for the bureaucrats if it maximizes
the total bribe income without the constraint that it be an equilibrium. One can
show that, if a BIME is not rst-best for the bureaucrats, then (corresponding to
the result (5) above):
6. If the track is replaced by a single bureaucrat, then the total bribes in the
BIME will be larger.
The conclusions (5) and (6) are relevant to an oft-proposed policy recommenda-
tion that in any jurisdiction the track of multiple bureaucrats should be replaced by
a single windowto which the entrepreneur can apply. Our analysis shows that
one cannot conclude that such a change will unambiguously result in an increase in
social e¢ ciency.
Our results also enable us to assess another much-advocated reform, the rota-
tion of bureaucrats among tracks. The multiplicity of equilibria again makes the
results ambiguous. However, our analysis suggests that, under certain plausible cir-
cumstances the rotation policy will actually result in a decrease in social e¢ ciency.
(Section 2.3).
2 A Formal Model
2.1 A One-Stage Game
The players in the one-stage game consist of a single entrepreneur (EP) and a single
track of N bureaucrats (BUs), with N  2; arranged in a specic sequence. In order
to get her project approved, EP must apply to and obtain approval from each of the
BUs in the prescribed order (i.e. BU1 rst, then BU2 etc.). If the project is rejected
by any one BU, the game ends and EP does not proceed further in the track.
Here is the complete description of the extensive form of the game. Let V denote
the projects potential value, which is uniformly distributed on some closed interval,
which we may normalize to be [0; 1]. The probability distribution of V (the prior)
is common knowledge, but the realized value of V is known only to EP.
If and when EP applies to BUn she incurs a cost c > 0. For convenience of
exposition, this cost is assumed to be the same for all BUs. The cost c is known to
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all the players. If EP applies to BUn, let bn  0 denote the bribe demanded by him.
The project is approved if and only if the bribe is paid. The bribe is demanded on
a take-it-or-leave-itbasis, so that if EP refuses to pay the bribe the game ends. It
is assumed that the BUs do not observe the bribes demanded by the other BUs.
Let an = 1 or 0 according as EP does or does not apply to BUn. If she does
apply, she incurs the application cost c > 0 and then learns the magnitude bn of the
bribe demanded by BUn. Let pn = 1 or 0 according as EP does or does not pay the
bribe. Note that if an = 0 or pn = 0 then the game is over. Thus, if an = 0 we have
pn = 0 and if pn = 0 then am = 0 for all m > n:
Call the part of the game in which EP faces BUn the nth step (n = 1; :::; N).
The action taken by EP in step n is the pair (an; pn). The action taken by BUn in
step n is, of course, bn.
For n  1, letHn denote the history of the game through step n, i.e., the sequence
of actions taken by all players through step n. A strategy for EP is a sequence of
functions,  = fA1; P1; :::; AN ; PNg, which determine EPs actions according to:
an = An(V;Hn 1); (1)
pn = Pn(V;Hn 1; an; bn):
(Here H0 denotes an exogenous constant, the "prehistory of the game.")
Since BUn does not know the magnitudes of any previously demanded bribes, his
strategy for the game is the magnitude of the bribe he demands:
bn  0: (2)
To complete the description of the game, we must describe the playerspayo¤
functions. The payo¤ for BUn is the bribe he demands, if it is paid, i.e.,
Un = pnbn: (3)
The payo¤ for EP is the value of the project if the project is approved, less the sum
of the application costs and bribes paid (whether or not the project is completely
approved). Thus EPs payo¤ is
U0 = pNV  
X
1nN
(anc+ pnbn): (4)
Finally, without loss of generality, assume:
0 < Nc < 1: (5)
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(Otherwise, no project would be protable.)
As usual, a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game is a prole of strategies such
that no player can increase his or her expected pay-o¤ by unilaterally changing his
or her strategy. A strategy is (weakly) undominated if there is no other strategy
that yields the player as high a payo¤ for all strategy proles of the other players,
and a strictly higher payo¤ for some strategy prole of the other players. For our
rst result, we shall conne ourselves to equilibria in undominated strategies.
Theorem 1 There is no equilibrium in which the project is approved with positive
probability.
We sketch here a proof of the theorem by contradiction. First observe that for
an equilibrium in undominated strategies, the bribes demanded by the BUs must
be strictly positive. Hence, if EP ever applies to the last BUN , he infers that EP
has already incurred a positive cost, [and this is true even if the application cost is
zero]. This inference inuences the size of the bribe he demands. One can verify
the following calculation:
Suppose that the EP has applied to BUN , and BUN infers that, for some M such
that 0  M  1; the projects value V , satises M  V  1, Then BUNs optimal
bribe is:
bN = max

M;
1
2

: (6)
Suppose that in an equilibrium BUN demands a bribe bn > 0. Then EP will apply
to BU1 if and only if
V 
NX
n=1
(c+ bn) M
But conditional on V M , BUNs optimal bribe is
bN = max

M;
1
2

M = Nc+
N 1X
n=1
bn + bN > bN (7)
Hence, ProbfEP applies to BU1}> 0 implies that bN is not an optimal response
to other playersstrategies, contradicting the supposition that the original strategy
prole was an equilibrium.
Remark 1 Observe that, for N  2, the theorem is valid even when c = 0.
8
We shall now construct a family of strategy proles for which no EP applies to
the rst BU , and hence no project is ever approved. A strategy prole in this family
will be called a null strategy prole (NSP). We shall then show that there exists an
NSP that is an equilibrium.
A particular NSP is characterized by N parameters, b
0
n, n = 1; :::; N . The pa-
rameter b
0
n represents the bribe that EP expects BUn to demand, and it is also the
bribe that BUn plans to demand. These parameters satisfy the conditions:
0 < b
0
n < 1; for n < N; (8)
max

1  c; 1
2

< b
0
N < 1:
The EPs strategy is: for 1  n  N , EP applies to BUn only if the value of her
project is as large as the sum of the expected cost of completing the track, whereas
she pays the actual bribe demanded only if the value of her project is as large as the
sum of this actual bribe and the cost of completing the track if the remaining BUs
demand their planned bribes.
The strategy of BUn is: If EP applies to him, demand the bribe b
0
n.
As is common in game-theoretic analyses, we wish to conne attention to equi-
libria in which the strategies are in some sense "credible," which involves examining
the behavior of the system "o¤ the equilibrium path." To this end, for the purpose of
the next theorem we nd it convenient to replace the requirement that strategies be
undominated by a condition that we call admissibility, which is in some sense more
demanding, but also somewhat more complex to state. First, a strategy of BU n is
admissible if the bribe demanded is strictly between zero and one. A bribe prole is
admissible if each BUs strategy is admissible. A strategy for EP is admissible if it
is a best response to some admissible bribe prole.
For a BU, we alter somewhat the denition of undominated strategy. An admis-
sible strategy for BUn is quasiundominated if there is no other admissible strategy
for him that yields him as high a payo¤ for all admissible strategy proles of the
other players, and a strictly higher payo¤ for some admissible strategy prole of the
other players.
Finally, an equilibrium strategy prole is admissible if EPs strategy is admissible,
and and each BUs strategy is admissible and quasiundominated.
Theorem 2 Suppose that,
for each n; 1=2 < b0n < 1;
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then the corresponding NSP is an admissible equilibrium, and for every value of V ,
EP does not apply to BU1.
The proof of the theorem is given the the Appendix.
Remark 2 There may be other equilibria of the one-stage game in which the prob-
ability that EPs project is approved is also zero.
At the risk of belaboring the obvious, we emphasize that, in a NSP equilibrium,
each player has a zero pay-o¤ . This property of aNSP equilibrium will be important
in the framework of the repeated game, where the threat of reverting to a NSP
will, under certain conditions, deter a BU from deviating from cooperative-like
behavior.
2.2 A RepeatedGame with Multiple Bureaucrats and a
Sequence of Entrepreneurs
Suppose that the one-stage game of the preceding subsection is repeated in an in-
nite sequence of periods, with a succession of EPs with independent and identically
distributed (IID) project values, but the same track of BUs. With a slight abuse
of standard terminology, we shall call this game the supergame. Strictly speaking,
the supergame is not a repeated game, since the EPs change from period to pe-
riod. However, because the project values are IID, the method of analysis and the
attainable results are similar to those of a strictly repeated game. In particular,
repeating the one-stage null-strategy prole equilibrium in every period, regardless
of the history of play in the previous periods, is an equilibrium of the supergame.
In the equilibria studied here, we call the bribes demanded on the equilibrium
path the normal bribes. On the equilibrium path, an EP applies if her project value
exceeds the application cost plus the normal bribes. Once she has applied, and
learned the bribe demanded by BUn she pays the bribe if her project value exceeds
the bribe plus the sum of the remaining bribes and costs. Call this EPs normal
behavior. We shall say that BUn defects in a particular period if in that period he
demands a bribe that strictly exceeds the normal bribe. If and when the EPs learn
that a defection has taken place, then all players will play the null-strategy-prole of
the one-stage game for T periods (where T , possibly innite, is a parameter of the
strategy prole). These T periods will constitute a punishment phase. After the
punishment phase is over (if ever), the players will return to their normal behavior
until the next defection, if there is one. Of course, on the equilibrium path there
is no defection and no punishment phase. Since a defection (eventually) triggers a
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punishment phase, we shall follow a standard terminology and call such a strategy
prole a trigger-strategy prole (TSP). Following Aumanns terminology, if T is
nite then the TSP is called relenting, whereas if T is innite, the TSP is called
grim.
The set of equilibria of the supergame will depend crucially on what information
the players in any one period have about the previous history of the game. We shall
assume that, if a defection occurs, the EPs learn about it D periods later, where D
is an exogenously determined parameter. We also assume that a BU remembers all
previous transactions in which he is involved. We can demonstrate that, if the BUs
(common) discount factor is not too small, then there is a family of TSP equilibria
for which there is a positive probability that EPs will apply to the BUs, pay the
bribes demanded, and retain a positive surplus.
If the bribes demanded are all zero, then all projects for which V > c will be
approved. We shall call this the economically e¢ cient outcome. We shall show
that as the discount factor approaches unity, there is a sequence of equilibria that
approach economic e¢ ciency.
Here is a more formal description of the model. Let V (t) denote the poten-
tial project value of the EP in period t, who is denoted by EP(t), where t =
0; 1; 2; :::ad inf. The project values are independent and uniformly distributed on
the unit interval, which fact is common knowledge. Only EP(t) knows the real-
ized value of V (t). The track of BUs is the same in all periods. In each period
t;EP(t) and BUs play the one-stage game dened in the previous subsection. With
an obvious corresponding notation, the action variables in period t are bn(t), a(t),
p(t). A players strategy determines, at each period, his or her actions as a function
of his or her information about the past history of play. The payo¤ of each BU is
the sum of his discounted one-period payo¤s, where the (constant) discount factor
is denoted by ; and 0 <  < 1. A NSP in this dynamic context with a sequence
EP(t) of entrepreneurs is dened by modifying equations () and (), writing an(t),
pn(t) instead of an; pn.
The following assumption is made about the information available to the players.
Assumption. At the beginning of period t, all the current players know the
history of all defections (if any) in all periods up to and including period t   D,
where D  1 is an exogenously given parameter. Only EP (t) knows value of her
project. All players know the history of the transactions in which they participated.
Finally, assume that the application cost, c, satises
0 < Nc < 1; (9)
and is the same for all EPs.
11
The trigger strategy proles (TSPs) for the supergames will now be dened.
First, normal bribes (bn) demanded by the BUs are all strictly positive, and satisfy:
1 
NX
n=1
(c+ bn) < 1: (10)
Secondly, for n  2, write
n 
X
mn
(c+ bm) = (N   n+ 1)c+
X
mn
bm:: (11)
The normal behavior of each EP(t) is given by:
an(t) = 1 i¤ V > n for n  1; (12)
pn(t) = 1 i¤ V > bn +
X
m>n
(c+ bm): (13)
If at period t no defection has occurred in the past, then the BUs demand the
normal bribes. If a defection by a BU occurs at period t, then the BUs demand the
same bribe as in period t for the next (D-1) periods. Thereafter they demand the
bribes (b
0
n) in the NSP prole, for the next T  1 periods, where T remains to be
specied. In period (t+D + T ), the clock is restarted with normal bribes until the
next phase, if any.
Although di¤erent EPs could in principle use di¤erent strategies, without essential
loss of generality we restrict the TSPs to those in which all EPs use the same strategy.
If at period t, no defection has occurred, then EP(t) behaves normally.If the rst
defection occurs at period t, then for the next (D-1) periods, EP(t) still behaves
normally, but during periods t + D; ::::; t + D + T   1 (the punishment phase) the
EPs do not apply at all . At period (t+D+ T ), the EPs begin to behave normally
again, until the next defection (if any). To sum up, during a punishment phase after
learning about a defection, the players are using a NSP.
Theorem 3 For any trigger strategy prole (TSP) satisfying the preceding condi-
tions, there exist  and T  su¢ ciently large such that, for all    and T  T ,
the TSP is an equilibrium of the supergame. Furthermore, as the discount fac-
tor approaches unity, there is a sequence of TSP equilibria that approach economic
e¢ ciency.
The proof uses a standard argument adapted to our framework; see L-M-R.
Remark 3 One can show that the social loss is an increasing function of the total
of the normal bribes: B  b1 + :::+ bN .
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2.3 Extreme Equilibria of the Repeated Game
In this subsection we examine the properties of two classes of extremeequilibria
of the repeated game with multiple bureaucrats, within the class of trigger strategy
prole equilibria studied in the previous section. The equilibria in the rst class,
called second-best, maximize the social surplus in the set of all equilibria. An
important property of second-best equilibria is that replacing the track with a single
bureaucrat increases the social surplus. The equilibria in the second class (called
BIME) maximize the total expected bribe income of the bureaucrats. For discount
factors close enough to one, it is possible for a BIME to achieve the maximum
expected bribe income that would be possible if the bureaucrats were able to collude,
i.e., act as a monopoly. If this collusive outcomeis not attainable as a BIME, then
replacing the track with a single bureaucrat increases the expected bribe income, and
decreases social surplus. We shall comment on the implications of these results in
Section 4 below.
For the formal proofs of the results in this subsection, see L-M-R.
2.3.1 Second-Best Equilibria
By a second-best equilibrium (SBE) is meant an equilibrium that minimizes (in the
set of all equilibria) the loss in expected total social surplus due to the system of
bribes. The outcome implemented in a SBE will be called a second-best outcome.
We show elsewhere (see L-M-R) that a second-best-outcome can be implemented
by a grim trigger-strategy prole equilibrium, i.e., with a trigger-strategy prole for
which the punishment period lasts forever (T = 1). The kind of argument that
leads to Theorem 3 also shows that as the discount factor approaches unity the SBE
approaches economic e¢ ciency.
Here is a heuristic explanation of why second-best outcomes can be attained
in the class of grim trigger-strategy prole equilibria, which we shall denote by G.
First, each EP participates for a single period, and she has no short-run incentive
to deviate from her equilibrium strategies in a TSP equilibrium (neither in a normal
phase nor in a punishment phase). Second, although the BUs have such a short-run
incentive in a normal phase, they are deterred by the threat of triggering a switch
to a punishment phase. Furthermore, if the punishment phase lasts forever, then a
BUs payo¤ is zero forever once a defection is detected (after D periods). But zero
is the lowest payo¤ that a BU can receive, and so the threat of triggering a switch to
an innitely long punishment phase is maximal. [Technically, zero is each BUs
maxmin payo¤ ]. Hence an equilibrium that minimizes the social loss in the set G
also minimizes the social loss in the set of all equilibria. We note that there may be
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second-best equilibria that are not in G, but in what follows we conne our attention
to those in G.
Theorem 4 If the track of N bureaucrats is replaced by a single window of one
bureaucrat, but with an application cost Nc, then the total second-best equilibrium
bribe is strictly reduced.
Let G(T ) denote the class of TSP equilibria for a given length, T; of the punish-
ment phase. Thus, in the preceding denition of second-best equilibria, G = G(1).
Dene a third-best equilibrium given T to be one that minimizes social loss in the class
G(T ). One can show that, for each T , the preceding theorem is true for third-best
equilibria given T .
2.3.2 Bribe-Income-Maximizing Equilibria
By a bribe-income-maximizing-equilibrium (BIME) given T is meant an equilibrium
that maximizes the total expected bribe income of the BUs in the class G(T ). Let
k =
(1  D)
1  D+T : (14)
Note that, since D and  are given exogenously, then if T is xed, so is k. In the
following two theorems, it is to be understood that T is xed, and is not mentioned
explicitly.
If k is small enough, but still positive, then the BUs can attain in equilibrium
the maximal collusive expected bribe income.
Theorem 5 If k is su¢ ciently small, then there is a BIME in which the total ex-
pected bribe income is the maximum possible, and B = (1 Nc)=2.
Theorem 6 If k is su¢ ciently small, but not so small that the maximum collusive
bribe income can be attained in equilibrium, then for any BIME with N > 1 bu-
reaucrats, replacing the track with a single BU and the same total application cost
increases the total expected bribe income.
3 Interpretations, Implications and Extensions
3.1 Corruption Hold-up
The ine¢ ciency of equilibrium in our model is an instance of the well-known phe-
nomenon of hold-up. Since the equilibrium bribes are strictly positive, when an
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entrepreneur faces the second or later bureaucrat in the track, she has already in-
curred a sunk cost, even if the cost of application is zero. (If the cost of application is
strictly positive, then hold-up occurs even with the rst bureaucrat). The ine¢ ciency
can be reduced, but not eliminated, in the repeated game by the implementation of
trigger-strategy equilibria (Theorem 3). The key parameter here is
k =

(1  D)=(1  D+T ); T <1;
1  D: T =1:
Recall that  is the discount factor, D is the delay of the information about past
transactions, and T is the length of the punishment phaseafter a defection. As in
the preceding section, let G(T ) denote the class of TSP equilibria for a given T; and
dene a third-best equilibrium given T to be one that minimizes social loss in the class
G(T ). One reason to consider cases in which T is nite ("relenting trigger strategies")
is that it may be behaviorally unrealistic to expect that the the participants will be
able to adhere to grim trigger strategies (T innite) in the presence of increasing
pressure to "relent" and try a fresh start.
Since both  and D are exogenous, whereas T is a parameter of the equilibrium,
one can think of the class G(T ) as being equivalently parameterized by k. One
can show that the smaller k is, the more e¢ cient are the corresponding third-best
equilibria, and a fortiori so are the second-best equilibria (Section 2.3.2). The
mediating parameter, k, is a decreasing function of  and T , and an increasing
function of D. Thus the more patient the bureaucrats are (the larger  is), the more
e¢ cient are the outcomes in the third-best equilibria or, alternatively, the shorter
can be the punishment phase to sustain a given level of e¢ ciency. On the other
hand, the longer the delay in getting information about past transactions (D), the
less e¢ cient are the third-best equilibria. However, note that a smaller value of k
can lead to a decrease in e¢ ciency in some other equilibria, as the analysis of the
bribe-income-maximizing shows (Section 2.3.2).
The one-stage game provides an extreme cost of hold-up. In this case there is no
equilibrium in which any project is approved, but there is an equilibrium in which no
project is approved (Theorems 1 and 2). This last equilibrium provides the threat
that forms part of the trigger-strategy equilibria.
Our structure of delayed information is only one of many possible models of what
the players might learn about past transactions. In particular, one might consider
a model in which some entrepreneurs become informed, possibly with delay (insid-
ers), and others (outsiders) are uninformed (D = 1). If the bureaucrats can
identify the insiders and outsiders, this produces a wedge between rms so outsiders
never enter the market, which reduces competition.
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Our model of the bargaining between the entrepreneurs and bureaucrats is one
in which the bureaucrats make take-it-or-leave-itdemands to the entrepreneurs.
At the other extreme, one might envisage that it is the entrepreneurs who make the
take-it-or-leave-it demands, in which case the ine¢ ciency would be eliminated, but
the bureaucrats would receive no bribe income. In between these extremes there is a
loss of e¢ ciency. Anecdotal evidence suggests that reality is closer to the bargaining
model that we have used here.
3.2 Capture
In this paper we conduct the analysis for the case in which all projects are qualied.
In a more general version of the model (L-M-R), we consider a situation where the
entrepreneur makes a decision whether or not to qualify prior to applying. The idea
is that in order to qualify for approval formally, each project must conform to certain
requirements (e.g., by satisfying some prescribed safety or duciary requirements).
Typically, qualication entails a cost, which we assume is proportional to the value of
the project. In the model of L-M-R this cost is incurred when the decision is made,
i.e., before the entrepreneur applies.7
In this more general setting a bureaucrat can approve unqualied projects as well
as qualied ones. The bribes demanded for the approval of qualied and unqualied
projects may be di¤erent. The type of corruption related to the approval of unquali-
ed projects is commonly referred to as capture, as distinct from the phenomenon
of demanding a bribe for the approval of a qualied project, which is referred to as
pure extortion.
The results in the paper extend to the case where both extortion and capture
are present. We can show that the second-bestequilibria are characterized by the
fact that all projects for which entrepreneurs apply are qualied. In contrast, in the
bribe maximizing equilibria (BIME) no project is qualied. In general, we cannot say
whether approved projects are qualied or not. From the point of view of the players
however, the cost incurred to qualify is a pure loss. For any equilibrium with
qualied projects, we can construct another equilibrium with unqualied projects
that yields higher expected payo¤s to both entrepreneurs and bureaucrats. This
suggests that the presence of corruption in the application procedures is likely to
induce losses in addition to preventing the realization of protable project, namely
losses due the realization of socially ine¢ cient or harmful projects.
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3.3 The Single-Window Policy
In the context of combating corruption in the procedures for applying for permits
(e.g., for new businesses), a much-advocated reform is the so-called single-window
policyor one-stop-shop. This policy has been interpreted in a variety of ways. A
common feature is that the entrepreneur meets with only a single bureaucrat. But it
is immediate that this single feature is insu¢ cient to yield any e¤ect. Indeed, assume
that the track structure is left untouched. The entrepreneur still needs approval from
a series of bureaucrats but only submits the application to one bureaucrat who sends
it further on the track. We may have a case where the rst bureaucrat demands
the sum of the bribes and pays them out to the other bureaucrats in exchange
for their approval. In Bulgaria this version of the single window policy has been
implemented in some town with very limited success, as one would expect.8 The
confusion reects the common view that the risk of bribery is due to the direct contact
between the entrepreneur and the various bureaucrats. What actually matters is
the actual extortion power associated with the decision. In the present paper we
investigate a one-stop-shop policy with the following content. The N licenses are
replaced by one single complex license that is delivered by one bureaucrat. Of course
in many cases, in reality the multiplicity of licenses remains. You cannot merge,
e.g., the Commercial Register with the Fire Department. What we have in mind is
that the application is processed by experts who have no extortion power. This is
an extreme version of reforms aimed at simplifying the application procedures, and
in particular at reducing the number of independent bureaucrats whose approval is
required to start or revise a project.
Theorems 4 and 6 shed some light on the potential value of such a reform. Para-
doxically, the single-window policy does not always lead to a reduction in the bribe
burden. Theorem 4 shows that a switch to a single window (with the same total
cost of application) in the second-best equilibrium does reduce the total amount of
the bribe, and hence reduces the social loss. In contrast with this optimistic result,
Theorem 6 shows that this switch will increase the social loss in the bribe-income-
maximizing equilibrium, unless the bribe income is already the maximum possible
that could be obtained through collusion of the bureaucrats.
Of course, there may be reasons to recommend the single-window policy that are
not reected in our present model, such as the possible increase in the transparency
of the approval process and the greater likelihood of detecting illegal activities. In
Russia rms have reported a decrease in total application cost (including the bribes
paid) following recent reforms (CEFIR 2002-2005 see www.cer.org). The reforms
were launched with much publicity and monitored by international organizations,
including a World Bank project. They were e¤ectively accompanied by an increase
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in transparency, including a stricter control of delays. [Using the threat of delays
to persuade applicants to pay bribes is not part of our formal model. Such delays
impose a cost on the applicant that is somewhere between that of immediate approval
(zero delay) and outright rejection (innite delay).]
3.4 Rotation of Bureaucrats
Our results enable us to assess another much-advocated reform, the rotation of bu-
reaucrats among tracks. The standard argument in favor of such measures is that
they reduce the opportunities for corrupt practices based on long-standing relation-
ships. There are many possible rotation policies, and it is beyond the scope of this
paper to discuss them all. Here is one that can be analyzed explicitly in the frame-
work of our model. Suppose that each track has a constant per-period probability,
, of being replaced by another track with di¤erent bureaucrats. Thus  = 0 gives
us our model of the innitely repeated game with one track, and  = 1 gives us
our model of the one-stage game. One can show that increasing this probability
is formally equivalent to reducing the discount factor. This, in turn, increases the
mediating parameter k (Section 2.3). Since there is a multiplicity of equilibria for
each value of k, the e¤ect of decreasing k is ambiguous without a rule that selects
a unique equilibrium for each value of k. For example, if we focus on, say, the
bribe-income-maximizing equilibria, then an increase in  leads to an decrease in
social loss. On the other hand, in the third-best (and hence second-best) equilibria
an increase in  leads to an increase in social loss.
One could argue that a long-lasting track provides the opportunity for the track
to migratefrom a low-bribe equilibrium to a high-bribe equilibrium. In this case, a
rotation of the bureaucrats out of a track might be the occasion for moving the track
back to an equilibrium that is socially preferable. However, from a theoretical point
of view this is all speculative, since game theory does not yet provide a good theory
of how equilibria are established in the rst place (in the context of a multiplicity of
equilibria), and how they might change through time.
3.5 Extensions
In a subsequent paper (in preparation), we introduce a third category of players,
intermediaries. For a fee, intermediaries undertake to carry out for an entrepreneur
the application process through the entire track. Using the methodology of the
present paper, we analyze the set of equilibria, and how it depends on the parame-
ters of the model. In particular, intermediaries may change the set of equilibrium
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outcomes by serving as an institutional memory of past behavior, and also by intro-
ducing an additional monopolistic element into the situation. Further research will
study the e¤ect of competition among intermediaries. An appropriate model is that
of product di¤erentiation. In this case, one can expect that di¤erent intermediaries
would charge di¤erent fees and correspondingly o¤er services that di¤er in delay,
reduction of detection, convenience, etc.
Other interesting topics that could be studied in this framework are: (1) com-
petition among tracks, reecting competition for investment by di¤erent countries
or by di¤erent jurisdictions (states or cities) within a country; (2) supervision and
enforcement.
4 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2. First observe that, in a NSP, EPs strategy is an optimal
response to the strategy prole of the BUs. From (8),X
mN
(c+ b
0
m) > c+ b
0
N > 1:
Hence, for all V  1; a1 = p1 = 0, so EP will never apply to the track. Therefore, for
all n, any bribe demand will result in a payo¤ of zero, so in particular, bn = b0n is an
optimal response to the other playersNSP strategy prole. It remains to show that
this equilbrium is admissible. A NSP bribe prole is admissible, and hence so is the
corresponding NSP strategy for EP. Thus it only remains to show that each BUs
strategy is quasiundominated (see the denition preceding the statement of Theorem
2).
Recall that, according to the hypothesis of the theorem, for each n,
1=2 < b0n < 1:
Let 00 denote a strategy for EP that is admissible with reference to an admissible
bribe prole, say b
00
= (b
00
1 ; :::; b
00
N). For 1  n  N , dene
Mk =
X
mk
(c+ b00m);
M = M1;
Lk =
X
mk
(c+ b00m) =M  Mk+1:
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If EP uses the strategy 00, and M  1, then EP will not apply to the track, and
the expected payo¤ to BUn will be zero for all values of b. Therefore, without loss
of generality, assume that
M < 1:
In this case, if BUn demands a bribe equal to b, then his expected payo¤ will be
U(b) =

b(1 M); 0  b  Ln;
b(1  b Mn+1); Ln  b  1: (15)
[To see this, observe that if EP applies to BUn, then she will pay the bribe b only
if V > b +Mn+1. However, since EP is using the strategy 00, the fact that she has
applied to BUn implies that she has applied to the track, and therefore that V > M .
Note that
b < Ln , b < M  Mn+1 ,M > b+Mn+1,
in which case V > M implies that V > b+Mn+1, i.e., the fact that EP has applied
to the track implies that she will pay the bribe b. On the other hand, if b > Ln, then
EP will pay the bribe only if V > b +Mn+1, which is not implied by the fact that
she has applied to the track.]
Returning to the proof of the theorem, the rst line of (15) is linearly increasing
in b, and the second line is quadratic in b and reaches a maximum at
b =
1 Mn+1
2
:
Hence, if Ln > b, then U(b) reaches its maximum at b = Ln. Note that, since
b0n > 1=2, and Mn+1  0,
b0n > b
:
Therefore, if we choose 00 such that Ln = b0n, then
U(b) < U(b0n) for all b 6= b0n;
which completes the proof that b0n is quasiundominated, and thus completes the proof
of the theorem.
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Notes
1See Elliott (1997, p. 177), who cites Klitgaard (1991)
2After citing relatively recent instances of corruption and/or attempts to eradicate corruptions in
Mexico, Ukraine, China, South Korea, Pakistan, Elliott (1997, p. 175) reminds us that corruption
scandals in recent years have also contributed to the downfall of governments in Ecuador, Brazil,
Italy, and, India [and, one can surely add Philippines, Indonesia,...]. Long-entrenched ruling
parties have been weakened, including Japans Liberal Democratic Party and Mexicos Institutional
Revolutionary Party. Watergate, Whitewater, FCPA, campaign nance reform have been among
the most intensively analyzed political issues in the U.S.A., and, on each corruptionin some form
has cast its shadow.
3The empirical literature, has also witnessed substantial growth with studies of individual coun-
tries as well as some cross-country data (two useful surveys are by Ades and Di Tella (1996) and
Lambsdor¤ (1999)). Researchers have started conrming or challenging plausiblehypotheses on
the causes and consequences of corruption. In the context of our project, we would like to recall
only a few interesting conclusions. Mauros early empirical work [(1995), (1997)] focuses on the re-
lationship between investment and corruption, and nds that corruption lowers investment, thereby
reducing growth. Related to this theme are the studies involving a large sample of developing and
transition economics [Morisset and Nesso (2002), Djankov et at (2001)] that reveal a correlation
between corruption and the cost (in terms of time and o¢ cial fees) of entry procedures.
4One of the rst studies of corruption in India was the Santhanam Committee Report (1964):
see Halayya (1985) for a detailed account of various cases of grand and petty corruptions and
government responses to recommendations on appropriate actions to combat corruption. See, e.g.,
Bhagwati [(1973, pp. 6-7), 1993] Roy (2003) and the 2003 Report by Transparency International
on the problem of multiple verications.
5Examples of typical anecdotes: the Financial Express, Wednesday, November 28, 2001: The
Japanese envoy Mr. Hirabayashi compliments the intent of the industry minister Murasoli Maran.
But he gets upset over Indias much talked about single window for foreign direct investment.
The joke is that India has forty single windows for one investor. We (have) let our feelings
and frustrations be known to Indian o¢ cers and captains of business. It is not easy to be working
here. Also: Indian Express, Monday, January 28, 2002: The US Ambassador to India said on
Monday that Indian bureaucratic red tape was chocking economic ties between the worlds two
most populous democracies. US foreign direct investment into India tumbled to $366 million in
2000 from $431 million in 1999 and $737 million in 1997, a slide which the Ambassador blamed on
innumerable rolls of red tape stretching to the horizon.
6Estimates of e¢ ciency-losses are also available for other countries; see the discussion of Mauros
bureaucratic e¢ ciency index (1995), and its link with investment discussed in Ades and Di Tella
(1996).
7It is important to point out that this specication of a qualication cost falls short of a realistic
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description of the process of approval and implementation of investment projects in many contexts.
An EP typically incurs some cost in preparing a proposal that is qualied on paper, and submits
an estimate of costs for upholding the regulatory standards. However, the more substantial part
of the cost is incurred during the phase of actual construction, which is often subject to further
on-site inspections. In the model we shorten this process by assuming that the EP will implement
the exact proposal qualied on paper. On the other hand, an unqualied project approved through
bribery will not result in any subsequent cost to the EP (nes/settlement of liability claims etc.).
A more elaborate model would be needed to capture these intricacies, but we do not expect that
our theoretical results would be signicantly a¤ected.
8In April 2005, one of us visited a town in Bulgaria on the behalf of the European Commission.
The secretary of regional anti-corruption council described the situation as follows. What happens
is that the entrepreneur is told by the bureaucrat who handles the application that his application
got stuck in some agency and that e¤ortsmust be made to get approval from that agency before
proceeding further.
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